| FMRS | 48 / 100 · D | 79 / 100 · B | 74 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 7 / 20 | 12 / 20 | 13 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 10 / 20 | 18 / 20 | 13 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 2 / 20 | 17 / 20 | 17 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 16 / 20 | 17 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 13 / 20 | 15 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Teams already on Snowflake who need to study or reproduce a legacy MCP integration for migration purposes
- Developers researching this project's architecture before moving to the official Snowflake MCP Server
| - Teams already using ClickHouse who want AI assistants to access data directly.
- Scenarios requiring fast, read-only data queries and schema exploration.
| - Teams that want precise control over which database operations an AI can perform, rather than open arbitrary SQL execution
- Scenarios needing a unified MCP setup across multiple database engines
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| Not for | - Any new project or production deployment, since the project is officially deprecated with no further fixes or features
- Users unfamiliar with Snowflake RBAC and SQL statement allowlisting who cannot audit the permission configuration themselves
| - Scenarios requiring write access to the database without explicit opt-in.
- Production environments with stringent security requirements that avoid default permission settings.
| - Lightweight cases that just want to run a few ad-hoc SQL queries without maintaining a tools.yaml config (a simpler single-database MCP may be a better fit)
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| Required permissions | - Requires valid Snowflake credentials (username/password, PAT, key pair, OAuth, or SSO)
- Server behavior is fully bound by the RBAC permissions of the connecting role, which needs access to the target databases/schemas/warehouses/Cortex services
- Enabling SQL execution or object-management tools requires explicitly allowlisting SQL statement types (Create, Drop, Update, etc.) in the configuration file
| - Requires read-only access to ClickHouse database (default).
- Optional: write access via CLICKHOUSE_ALLOW_WRITE_ACCESS.
- Optional: destructive operations via CLICKHOUSE_ALLOW_DROP.
| - Database credentials (username/password/connection string) are supplied via env vars or config
- A tool's actual permission is whatever SQL statement is defined in tools.yaml — designed for least privilege, but misconfiguration can still over-expose access
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| Risks and side effects | - The project is officially marked deprecated and unmaintained, so unresolved security or functional issues may exist — not recommended for new deployments
- Misconfigured sql_statement_permissions or an 'Unknown' statement type set to True can allow destructive SQL (DROP, DELETE, UPDATE) to execute beyond intended scope
- Sensitive credentials (private keys, passwords) are passed via environment variables or CLI arguments, requiring careful protection of the deployment environment
- Programmatic Access Tokens (PATs) do not evaluate secondary roles, forcing a single broadly-privileged role and coarser permission control
| - If write access is enabled, AI might make unintended modifications.
- If DROP access is enabled, data deletion could occur accidentally.
- Credentials may be exposed via environment variables.
| - If tools.yaml defines SQL statements that allow unconstrained writes or deletes, the AI could accidentally modify data
- The prebuilt toolsets (--prebuilt) favor convenience and may expose broader query capability than a specific business actually needs — use a custom tools.yaml in production
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| Supported clients | Claude Desktop, Cursor, fast-agent, Codex, Visual Studio Code (GitHub Copilot) | Claude Desktop | Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Zed, Antigravity |
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| Tools | 6 | 4 | 0 |
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