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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionHome Assistant MCPTalk to your house. Your AI assistant connected to Home Assistant via MCP. 50+ tools, three transports, one bunx command.CompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS58 / 100 · C75 / 100 · B
Reliability8 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions14 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance12 / 2014 / 20
Documentation14 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience10 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Users wanting deep AI integration with smart home
  • Privacy-conscious users needing local voice control
  • Developers looking for multiple deployment options (STDIO, HTTP, Docker)
  • Enthusiasts exploring AI-driven automation
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Users without a Home Assistant instance
  • Enterprises requiring official vendor support (community-maintained)
  • Users extremely averse to any remote hosting (though local voice processing available)
  • Users needing only basic functionality (other simpler MCP servers may be more appropriate)
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Read Home Assistant entity states (lights, climate, media, etc.)
  • Control device states (on/off, brightness, temperature, etc.)
  • Access history data, logs, and configuration
  • Execute automations, scenes, and notifications
  • Manage dashboards and to-do lists
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • Token leak: long-lived access token could be abused for unauthorized control.
  • Configuration errors may result in unintended actions (e.g., turning off critical safety devices).
  • HTTP/WS transport requires JWT auth, but misconfiguration could expose the service.
  • Voice features may introduce additional security risks (e.g., microphone access).
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, CursorClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools8214