| FMRS | 49 / 100 · D | 79 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 8 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 10 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 8 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 12 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 11 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Developers using Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline, OpenCode, or another supported AI coding client
- Teams reviewing AI-generated code, MCP tools, prompts, and supply-chain risks
- Teams needing security evidence before CI, releases, or vendor reviews
| - Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
- Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
- Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
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| Not for | - Users who only need traditional dependency vulnerability scanning
- Users looking for a replacement for npm audit
- Users needing hosted semantic review without configuring a model provider
| - Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
- Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
- Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
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| Required permissions | - Read access to projects, files, Git diffs, MCP servers, or dependency data being scanned
- The auto-fix capability may require write access to project files
- Semantic review uses the model provider selected by the user
| - Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
- Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
- Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
- Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
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| Risks and side effects | - AI-generated code may introduce SQL injection, XSS, command injection, unsafe cryptography, or secrets
- MCP tools may contain description injection, tool-name spoofing, environment-variable exposure, or command-execution risks
- AI-generated package names may not exist, creating package-squatting or dependency-confusion risks
- Semantic review sends relevant content to the selected provider; rule-based scans and MCP scans run locally
| - Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
- Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
- Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
- Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
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| Supported clients | Claude Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop, Windsurf, Cline, Kilo Code, OpenCode, Cody | Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue |
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| Tools | 17 | 0 |
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