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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionAgentic Threat Hunting Framework MCP ServerMemory, structure, and agency for your threat hunting programCompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS60 / 100 · C75 / 100 · B
Reliability9 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions13 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance12 / 2014 / 20
Documentation13 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience13 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Security teams wanting persistent memory and structure for threat hunting
  • Analysts using Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, or Cursor
  • Organizations wiring existing PEAK/TaHiTI processes into AI workflows
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Enterprises needing an authenticated multi-user remote service out of the box
  • Users expecting a replacement for their SIEM/EDR platform
  • Environments without local workspace file access
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Read the entire ATHF workspace
  • Write/update hunt and research records
  • Some tools invoke LLM agents (at your expense)
  • Bind a local port when using sse or streamable-http transports
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • The sse and streamable-http transports bind to 127.0.0.1 and are unauthenticated
  • Every tool reads your whole workspace, risking exposure of sensitive hunt data
  • Some tools invoke LLM agents at your expense
  • A routable interface is bound only when --host is passed, and then an authenticating proxy is required
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Code, GitHub Copilot, CursorClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools014