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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionHeimdall MCP ServerOne tool standing watch over your entire App Store Connect accountMartinLoop MCP ServerAn independent control layer that gives AI coding agents budgets, brakes, and receipts
FMRS61 / 100 · C79 / 100 · B
Reliability8 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions14 / 2018 / 20
Maintenance12 / 2016 / 20
Documentation14 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience13 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • iOS/macOS developers and release teams needing every App Store Connect endpoint
  • Anyone working with subscriptions, IAP, StoreKit 2 transactions and refunds
  • Users who want confirm-before-write safety and local key custody
  • Teams using multiple MCP clients (Claude, Codex, Cursor) wanting one-step registration
  • Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
  • Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
  • Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
Not for
  • Users who won't install Node locally or prefer remote HTTP servers
  • Those expecting the server itself to generate marketing/reply text (your own model writes it)
  • Anyone seeking a Fastlane replacement for scripted CI pipelines (it's positioned as the interactive complement)
  • Users looking for an official Apple tool — this project is unaffiliated with Apple
  • Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
  • Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
  • Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
Required permissions
  • Reads App Store Connect API credentials (Key ID, Issuer ID, .p8 private key)
  • Accesses the Apple App Store Connect and App Store Server APIs
  • StoreKit 2 transaction tools need the app's Bundle ID
  • Optional write access: writes confirm by default; ASC_CONFIRM_WRITES=0 disables confirmation and --read-only removes mutating tools entirely
  • Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
  • Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
  • Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
  • Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
Risks and side effects
  • A leaked .p8 key grants signing power over your App Store account at whatever role was granted; use Keychain storage, not plain-text config
  • Write-capable tools can change prices, submit for review or delete resources; a misread instruction could still execute after confirmation
  • 2.x is a breaking release; 1.x profile names in configs may have changed
  • The full tool surface exceeds 100k tokens of definitions if profiles aren't narrowed
  • No telemetry and local-only operation means you track version updates yourself
  • Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
  • Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
  • Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
  • Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Claude, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code, AntigravityClaude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue
Tools10