| FMRS | 67 / 100 · C | 75 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 11 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 15 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 12 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 15 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 14 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Users who want health data to stay local rather than pass through a third-party server
- Users who already have an Apple Health CSV export from Simple Health Export CSV
- Quantified-self practitioners who are comfortable with SQL and DuckDB
- Claude Desktop users working from a trusted MCP client
| - Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
- Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
- Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
- Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
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| Not for | - Users who only have the native Apple Health export.xml and have not converted it to CSV
- Users who do not want query results potentially sent to the model provider configured in their MCP client
- Anyone treating health reports as medical advice or diagnosis
- Users who need persistent incremental import or a database reused across processes
| - Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
- Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
- Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
- Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
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| Required permissions | - Read the Apple Health CSV export files in the directory given by HEALTH_DATA_DIR
- DuckDB processes data in memory, bounded by MAX_MEMORY_MB
- The server itself makes no network requests and does not upload the export; however, query results returned to your MCP client may be sent to that client's configured model provider
| - Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
- Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
- Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
- Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
- Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
- Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
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| Risks and side effects | - Every tool can reach the whole configured history, so only start this server from an MCP client you trust with that data
- Health data is sensitive; once query results are sent to a model provider they leave the local environment
- The first request that needs a table loads that table's full CSV history, with no date window
- Tables are held in memory; an export that does not fit within MAX_MEMORY_MB fails with an explicit error instead of spilling to disk
- Device overlap can produce duplicate-looking measurements, so queries may need to account for sourceName
- Health reports summarize recorded data and are not medical advice
| - A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
- Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
- If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
- `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
- Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
- The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
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| Supported clients | Claude Desktop | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro |
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| Tools | 3 | 14 |
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