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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionArionThe first agentic AI desktop app for geospatial analysisCompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS37 / 100 · D75 / 100 · B
Reliability3 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions7 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance13 / 2014 / 20
Documentation9 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience5 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Geospatial analysts wanting a unified desktop GIS + AI workflow
  • Developers who want to run local LLMs and connect custom MCP tools
  • Open-source users comfortable building from source under GPL-3.0
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Users looking for an MCP server entry to configure in clients like Claude Desktop (Arion is not an MCP server and ships no server manifest)
  • Users who need official turn-key installers (binary releases are not yet published)
  • Non-technical users unwilling to build an Electron app and compile native modules
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Local file system read/write for app data (SQLite) and the knowledge base (PGlite)
  • Network access to call cloud LLM provider APIs
  • Access to a local Ollama instance if local models are configured
  • Execution of system GDAL binaries for raster processing
  • Connections to user-defined MCP servers and execution of their tools
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • The project is early-stage (v0.0.14); several features (plugin system, Python agent runtimes, SpatiaLite integration) are planned only
  • Building from source is required; native modules (better-sqlite3, keytar) can fail to compile
  • Connecting custom MCP servers executes external code whose safety you must evaluate yourself
  • With cloud LLMs, query content is sent to third-party APIs
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools014