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DimensionAssetOpsBenchA multi-agent MCP benchmark and framework for industrial asset operationsCompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS45 / 100 · D75 / 100 · B
Reliability6 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions7 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance14 / 2014 / 20
Documentation10 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience8 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Maintenance engineers
  • Reliability specialists
  • Facility planners
  • Industry 4.0 researchers
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Users requiring verified production connectors, authentication, or transport details.
  • Users seeking general-purpose chat or non-industrial asset-maintenance tools.
  • Users expecting to run the complete scenarios without consulting the project setup documentation.
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Requires access to the simulated industrial environment data used by the project.
  • Depending on the task, it may need to read sensor, asset, FMEA, alert, and work-order records.
  • Specific authentication, authorization, and write permissions are not described in the provided material.
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • The server manifest is unavailable, so the actual tool surface, startup method, transport, and authentication details require confirmation.
  • The project is under active development; the main branch may differ from branches used for publications.
  • Operations such as adding failure modes, registering models, and running recipes may change records in the project environment; permissions and rollback behavior are not described.
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools3814