| FMRS | 40 / 100 · D | 79 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 6 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 7 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 9 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 11 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 7 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Teams that need enforced process control and an auditable journal
- Users working across multiple AI coding harnesses who want one process definition
- Complex agentic workflows that must be replayable, resumable, and gated by humans
- Engineering teams that want headless orchestration in CI/CD without an external AI agent
| - Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
- Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
- Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
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| Not for | - Users who only need one-off chat or single-step code generation
- Environments where installing Node.js or running external CLIs is not possible
- Teams wanting fully autonomous automation that cannot tolerate mandatory stops and approvals
- Users who want to consume the kip-sdk package from npm (it is private/0.0.1, unpublished)
| - Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
- Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
- Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
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| Required permissions | - Write access to the run state directory (default ~/.a5c/runs/, with repo-local .a5c/runs/ compatibility reads)
- Create or modify files in the project directory, as determined by the process code being run
- Perform anything an AI agent can do inside a process, including installing npm packages, generating CI/CD configuration, and setting up git hooks
- Invoke discovered harness CLIs and external commands during process execution
- Read and modify .a5c/compression.config.json to configure compression layers
| - Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
- Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
- Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
- Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
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| Risks and side effects | - Process code is the authority, so a poorly written process can cause unintended file changes or command execution
- Quality-gated processes may iterate repeatedly until gates pass, consuming significant tokens and time
- Plugin installation uses user scope, affecting all sessions for that user
- Blueprints can install npm packages, modify linter rules, and write CI configuration, so their instructions should be reviewed before approval
- The README states babysitter harness:install and harness:discover are deprecated, so older commands may stop working
| - Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
- Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
- Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
- Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
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| Supported clients | Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot | Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue |
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| Tools | 0 | 0 |
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