| FMRS | 46 / 100 · D | 84 / 100 · B | 79 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 8 / 20 | 17 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 8 / 20 | 16 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 13 / 20 | 16 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 7 / 20 | 17 / 20 | 19 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 10 / 20 | 18 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - MCP clients that need controlled local file access
- Developers who want to explicitly constrain filesystem operations
| - Local assistants that need to work inside explicitly approved directories
- Individuals and development teams that want path-based data boundaries
| - Serious Obsidian users who want AI agents reading and writing their vault
- Users wanting self-hosted, plugin-free operation with no external APIs
- Mobile/multi-device workflows accessing the vault remotely
- Security-conscious users (OAuth 2.1, atomic writes, container hardening)
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| Not for | - Workflows that require access to unauthorized directories
- Users seeking a server with documented tool names or broader capabilities
| - Highly sensitive environments that cannot allow model access to local file contents
- Shared remote file-service use cases
| - Users unwilling to run Docker or self-host a server
- Non-Obsidian note tools (Notion, Logseq, etc.)
- Scenarios requiring only a stdio local process without an HTTP server
- Remote multi-device sync without an Obsidian Sync subscription (the remote image requires one)
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| Required permissions | - The server needs file-operation access to the directories listed in allowed-directories
- SSE and Streamable HTTP modes require use of the configured local port
| - Read access to every local directory listed in the configuration
- Filesystem write access when write or move tools are enabled
| - Read/write access to the Obsidian vault folder (bind mount /vault, rw)
- Persistent /data volume (search index, OAuth token DB, logs)
- MCP_AUTH_TOKEN as Bearer token (also the JWT signing key)
- Obsidian Sync token for headless sync in remote mode
- Local download of embedding/reranker models (~45MB total), no external API calls
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| Risks and side effects | - An overly broad allowed-directories value may expand the scope of local files that can be exposed or modified
- When using a local SSE or HTTP endpoint, port and access-scope configuration should be reviewed
- The source does not specify individual filesystem tools, authentication, or authorization mechanisms
| - Sensitive files inside an allowed directory may enter model context
- Write and move tools change real files; keep scopes narrow and maintain backups
| - The server can read and write personal notes — guard MCP_AUTH_TOKEN carefully; leaking it exposes the whole vault
- Writes to real note files; despite atomic writes and protected paths, misconfiguration can alter data
- OAuth token DB lives on the /data volume; container compromise could expose valid sessions
- Remote deployments expose a public port — set PUBLIC_URL and reverse proxy correctly
- The remote image bundles proprietary obsidian-headless (not MIT-licensed); requires an active Obsidian Sync subscription
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| Supported clients | | Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf | Claude Code, Claude Desktop, claude.ai, Cursor, OpenCode, MCP Inspector |
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| Tools | 0 | 6 | 30 |
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