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DimensionUI-TARS Filesystem MCP ServerRestricted filesystem access for MCPObsidian Web MCPSecure remote access to your Obsidian vault over HTTPS with OAuth 2.0 authentication.
FMRS46 / 100 · D68 / 100 · C
Reliability8 / 209 / 20
Security and permissions8 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance13 / 2014 / 20
Documentation7 / 2017 / 20
Setup experience10 / 2012 / 20
Best for
  • MCP clients that need controlled local file access
  • Developers who want to explicitly constrain filesystem operations
  • Users who want secure remote access to their Obsidian vault from any device.
  • Integrating Claude.ai (web) or mobile with Obsidian.
  • Those needing concurrent writes with Obsidian Sync without file conflicts.
Not for
  • Workflows that require access to unauthorized directories
  • Users seeking a server with documented tool names or broader capabilities
  • Users who only need local stdio MCP access without remote capabilities.
  • Those unwilling to set up an OAuth password or use a Cloudflare Tunnel.
  • Users with extremely high security requirements who distrust network exposure (though encrypted).
Required permissions
  • The server needs file-operation access to the directories listed in allowed-directories
  • SSE and Streamable HTTP modes require use of the configured local port
  • Read and write files in the directory specified by VAULT_PATH.
  • Perform file operations (move, delete with soft delete to .trash).
  • Create daily notes, write binary files.
  • Maintain an in-memory frontmatter index, potentially modifying index files.
  • Access the network (for Cloudflare Tunnel, heartbeat URLs).
Risks and side effects
  • An overly broad allowed-directories value may expand the scope of local files that can be exposed or modified
  • When using a local SSE or HTTP endpoint, port and access-scope configuration should be reviewed
  • The source does not specify individual filesystem tools, authentication, or authorization mechanisms
  • Credential leakage: exposed OAuth password or MCP token could allow unauthorized access.
  • Path traversal mitigation is not infallible; keep updated.
  • Extension system is not sandboxed; loading untrusted extensions could be risky.
  • Audit log is best-effort and not tamper-evident; records may be dropped at runtime.
  • Misconfiguration may cause the server to fail to start or expose vulnerabilities.
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Claude Mobile, Claude Web
Tools020