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DimensionChinese Sensitive Words MCP ServerChinese sensitive/prohibited word detection MCP Server for Xiaohongshu, Douyin, Kuaishou and BilibiliCompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS51 / 100 · D75 / 100 · B
Reliability8 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions8 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance11 / 2014 / 20
Documentation12 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience12 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Creators and operators publishing Chinese content on Xiaohongshu, Douyin, Kuaishou and Bilibili
  • Brands, e-commerce and livestream teams that need pre-publish compliance checks on Chinese copy
  • Users who want sensitive-word detection inside Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code or OpenClaw
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Scenarios requiring moderation of non-Chinese content
  • Users expecting a fully offline local dictionary (the npm package calls a remote API, which can be pointed elsewhere via WORDSCHECK_API_BASE and WORDSCHECK_ACCESS_TOKEN)
  • Users who treat its output as an official platform moderation verdict
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Execute the chinese-sensitive-words-mcp package via npx
  • Optionally pass WORDSCHECK_ACCESS_TOKEN as an environment variable to lift the free quota
  • Optionally set WORDSCHECK_API_BASE as an environment variable to point to a custom service address
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • Without a TOKEN the free quota is 100 requests/day and usage is limited beyond that
  • Detection only covers its own dictionary, so both misses and false positives are possible; it does not replace official platform moderation
  • When a custom WORDSCHECK_API_BASE is configured, your copy is sent to that address, so you must verify its trustworthiness
  • Judgements about sensitive or prohibited words change over time; although the dictionary is updated daily it may lag behind platform rule changes
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, OpenClawClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools214