| FMRS | 65 / 100 · C | 79 / 100 · B |
| Reliability | 9 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 12 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 14 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 16 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 14 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
| Best for | - Developers who want private, self-hosted, version-accurate documentation grounding for AI coding assistants
- Teams wanting to index internal or third-party docs without sending code to external hosted services
| - Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
- Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
- Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
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| Not for | - Users wanting a zero-setup hosted service without running their own server
- Users needing immediate answers for documentation that hasn't been scraped/indexed yet
- Use cases requiring guaranteed 100% accurate retrieval with no keyword/semantic search misses
| - Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
- Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
- Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
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| Required permissions | - Outbound network access to fetch documentation from websites, GitHub, npm, and PyPI
- Read access to local files, folders, and archives when indexing local sources
- Local disk/storage for the documentation index (Docker deployments use /data and /config volumes)
- Network access and an API key to a third-party embedding provider (e.g. OpenAI) if semantic search is enabled
- Binding a local network port (default 6280) to serve the Web UI and MCP endpoint
| - Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
- Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
- Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
- Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
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| Risks and side effects | - Fetching and indexing arbitrary external URLs can pull in untrusted or malicious content
- Binding the server to 0.0.0.0 without configuring authentication (OAuth2/OIDC) can expose the Web UI, MCP endpoint, and indexed documentation to anyone on the network
- Processing untrusted archives, Office documents, and PDFs carries the general risk of file-parsing bugs
- Embedding-provider API keys (e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY) are supplied via environment variables and sent to the third-party provider
| - Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
- Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
- Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
- Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
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| Supported clients | Claude Desktop, Cline, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI | Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue |
| Tools | 1 | 0 |