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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionDomain Memory AgentAn MCP server for domain-specific knowledge management with semantic search and summarization.CompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS28 / 100 · D75 / 100 · B
Reliability4 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions5 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance12 / 2014 / 20
Documentation3 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience4 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • MCP users who want a lightweight, dependency-light knowledge base.
  • Cases where TF-IDF retrieval and extractive summarization are sufficient.
  • Developers exploring non-official domain knowledge servers inside the Claude Code plugin marketplace ecosystem.
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • High-fidelity semantic search requiring vector/embedding retrieval or neural summarization.
  • Production knowledge platforms that need documented authentication, encryption, and access controls.
  • Users who need a complete tool catalog or official support commitments before installing.
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • The source does not document an explicit permission list.
  • Because transport is stdio, the server is launched as a local process by the MCP client; actual filesystem or network access depends on the npm package implementation, which is not described in the supplied manifest.
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • Unofficial third-party server; it is not maintained by Anthropic, Claude Code, or the upstream product/protocol owner.
  • Installing an npm package carries normal supply-chain integrity and dependency risks.
  • The manifest does not list concrete tool names, security model, or data-handling guarantees.
  • Storage, encryption, and retention of knowledge-base data are not described in the provided materials.
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools014