| FMRS | 67 / 100 · C | 79 / 100 · B |
| Reliability | 10 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
|---|
| Security and permissions | 14 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 13 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 17 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 13 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
| Best for | - Large repositories and document collections
- Multi-turn, log-heavy AI agent sessions
- Teams requiring evidence traceability, recovery, and audit records
- Developers who want local processing and control over the model integration path
| - Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
- Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
- Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
|
| Not for | - Small projects or prompts already within budget
- MCP-only setups that require automatic interception of every model request
- Tasks that require the full context to remain visible at all times
- Treating scoped benchmark results as guarantees across all models and production workloads
| - Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
- Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
- Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
|
| Required permissions | - Requires access to configured local project code, documents, logs, or other context data
- MCP attachments can be scoped by project and grant scope, given an expiry, and revoked
- Proxy mode requires the user to configure the relevant provider API key; Entroly does not choose the provider or receive its credentials
| - Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
- Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
- Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
- Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
|
| Risks and side effects | - Compression can omit relevant evidence; review Context Receipts and verification results
- Exact recovery depends on retained receipts and the local recovery store; deleting that state removes the recovery path
- MCP integrations do not automatically intercept every model request; provider savings require routing through the Entroly proxy
- Unknown or ambiguous structures pass through unchanged, and unsafe overflow may produce HTTP 413
- README benchmarks are scoped to particular datasets, budgets, models, and versions, not universal guarantees
| - Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
- Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
- Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
- Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
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| Supported clients | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Codex, OpenClaw, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code MCP clients, Zed, GitHub Copilot CLI | Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue |
| Tools | 0 | 0 |