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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionGBrainAn open-source brain layer for your AI agents, with synthesis, graph traversal, and gap analysis.CompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS66 / 100 · C75 / 100 · B
Reliability8 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions13 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance16 / 2014 / 20
Documentation16 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience13 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Personal knowledge management that requires actual answers beyond search (synthesis + gap analysis)
  • Teams wanting to build shared institutional memory (with OAuth scoping)
  • AI agents needing persistent memory (automatic ingestion, enrichment, consolidation)
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Scenarios requiring real-time data streams (depends on scheduled syncs and crawling)
  • Users without API keys or willing to configure an embedding provider (requires at least one)
  • Users wanting a fully managed cloud service (requires self-hosting)
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Read/write access to local filesystem (for brain repo and imports)
  • Network access to external APIs (unlocks embedding providers, LLMs, ingestion webhooks)
  • Environment variable access for API keys (e.g., OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.)
  • Local database (PGLite or Postgres)
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • Package confusion: the 'gbrain' package on npm is unrelated and may cause conflicts; install only from GitHub
  • Data privacy: local data is secure, but remote deployments must secure OAuth tokens and API keys
  • LLM costs: 'think' and synthesis features consume LLM API calls, incurring expenses
  • Performance issues: large brain syncs may take time or stall (troubleshooting provided)
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, Perplexity, ChatGPT, Claude CoworkClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools1014