| FMRS | 36 / 100 · D | 75 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 6 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 8 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 7 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 10 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 5 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Heavy users who need scripted, batched, or pipeline-ready Flow generation
- Automation and AI-video projects that want to expose Flow generation to agents
- Developers with Google Flow access and Veo credits outside restricted regions
| - Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
- Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
- Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
- Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
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| Not for | - Users expecting official Google support or an official API
- Users unwilling to accept account-automation risk or spend their own Flow credits
- Users needing headless pure-HTTP or serverless browserless deployment
- Users wanting to redistribute or resell the tool beyond Google's services
| - Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
- Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
- Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
- Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
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| Required permissions | - Requires the user's own logged-in Google Flow session and account credentials
- Persists a local Playwright Chromium profile (default per-user directory, configurable via GFLOW_CLI_HOME)
- Writes generated outputs to a local output directory (or via GFLOW_CLI_STORAGE_URI to S3, MinIO, or Google Cloud Storage)
- Reaches Google's private Flow interfaces (aisandbox-pa.googleapis.com or the migrated batchexecute endpoint)
- Video generation spends Flow credits on that account
| - Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
- Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
- Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
- Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
- Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
- Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
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| Risks and side effects | - The tool is alpha and reverse-engineered with no Google affiliation, and can break when Google's endpoints or UI change without notice
- Automation is subject to Google's ToS and carries account-flagging risk; the project deliberately uses no proxies, no fingerprint spoofing, and does not pretend it isn't automation
- Video generation spends real credits; when the UI drifts the CLI fails fast and loudly (e.g. selector drift = exit 23) rather than resubmitting
- The MIT license covers only its code and grants no rights to Flow, Veo output, or any Google service
- Installing from a local checkout without pinning Playwright can pull an untested browser driver that silently wedges generation
| - A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
- Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
- If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
- `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
- Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
- The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
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| Supported clients | Claude Code | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro |
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| Tools | 0 | 14 |
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