| FMRS | 63 / 100 · C | 79 / 100 · B |
| Reliability | 8 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
|---|
| Security and permissions | 15 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
|---|
| Maintenance | 10 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
|---|
| Documentation | 17 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
|---|
| Setup experience | 13 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
| Best for | - Teams already using the Harness platform for CI/CD, GitOps, or Feature Flags management
- Automated workflows that need to dynamically discover organizations/projects rather than hardcode configuration
- Enterprises wanting centralized governance and audit logging via MCP gateways (Docker MCP Gateway, Portkey, LiteLLM, etc.)
| - Developers auditing NPM dependencies within AI workflows
- Teams performing supply chain security assessments
- Users of Claude Desktop, Cursor, or VS Code
|
| Not for | - Teams not using the Harness platform
- Use cases that require one tool per API endpoint with fine-grained per-tool permission control
- Accounts without a Harness API key or without Harness Support enabling the hosted MCP service
| - Projects outside the NPM ecosystem (e.g., pure Python/Go)
- Environments without network access to deps.dev, OSV.dev, and the npm registry
- Scenarios requiring maintenance by an official upstream vendor
|
| Required permissions | - Requires a Harness personal access token (PAT) or service account token (SAT); the account ID is typically auto-extracted from the token
- Has read-write access (create/update/delete/execute) by default; can be restricted to read-only with HARNESS_READ_ONLY=true
- In multi-user HTTP mode, each session supplies its own x-harness-api-key — the server itself holds no credentials
| - Network access to the NPM registry and external services (deps.dev, OSV.dev, OpenSSF, npms.io, GitHub)
- Read access to workspace lockfiles (pnpm-lock.yaml, package-lock., yarn.lock) for cache invalidation
|
| Risks and side effects | - Mutating operations (create, update, delete, execute) can directly modify production pipelines, feature flags, or infrastructure configuration, so misuse can cause outages
- Running HTTP transport on a non-loopback bind without HARNESS_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN can expose the server to unauthorized access; HARNESS_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_HTTP=true explicitly disables that protection
- Audit logging omits raw request/response bodies by default, but HARNESS_LOG_UNSAFE_BODIES can enable them, which may then contain secrets
| - Third-party READMEs and changelogs are untrusted external content; they are wrapped in tags with _meta flags but should still be handled cautiously
- Depends on availability and accuracy of external services
- Batch requests are capped at 25 packages to prevent registry enumeration; larger sets require batching
- Third-party open source project, not officially maintained by NPM or Anthropic
|
| Supported clients | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Devin Desktop | Claude Desktop, VS Code, Cursor |
| Tools | 11 | 19 |