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DimensionHive Intelligence MCPManaged crypto market infrastructure for AI agentsCompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS57 / 100 · C75 / 100 · B
Reliability6 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions12 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance10 / 2014 / 20
Documentation16 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience13 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • AI agent developers needing broad crypto context — prices, DeFi, wallets, security — from multiple providers in one place
  • Teams doing crypto due diligence with Claude, Cursor, VS Code, or other remote-HTTP-MCP clients
  • Integrators who want one API key instead of separate upstream provider credentials
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Users who need to self-host or modify the MCP server source (the server is closed-source and managed)
  • Users seeking unlimited free usage (credit-based pricing applies)
  • General-purpose tasks unrelated to crypto
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Hive API key (Authorization Bearer or X-API-Key header, optional secret)
  • Optional upstream provider keys (COINGECKO_PRO_API_KEY, ALCHEMY_API_KEY, HELIUS_API_KEY, MORALIS_API_KEY, TENDERLY_API_KEY, GOPLUS_APP_KEY/SECRET, CODEX_API_KEY, etc.)
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • Credit-based billing: each tool call consumes credits and rate limits apply
  • Security scores are not investment advice; honeypot/rugpull results may be incomplete or lag
  • On-chain text (token names, memos) should be treated as untrusted input with prompt-injection risk
  • Data may come from cached or degraded sources; check provenance and freshness labels in responses
  • Leaked API keys can be abused; keep keys server-side and rotate them
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, Gemini CLIClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools614