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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionHyper MCPA fast, secure MCP server that extends its capabilities through WebAssembly plugins.MartinLoop MCP ServerAn independent control layer that gives AI coding agents budgets, brakes, and receipts
FMRS67 / 100 · C79 / 100 · B
Reliability11 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions13 / 2018 / 20
Maintenance15 / 2016 / 20
Documentation16 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience12 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Developers who need highly extensible and secure AI services with the flexibility to write plugins in multiple languages.
  • Teams that want to distribute and manage plugins via OCI registries.
  • Enterprise applications requiring sandboxing and resource limits.
  • Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
  • Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
  • Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
Not for
  • Clients that require HTTP transports (like SSE or streamable-http), since hyper-mcp defaults to stdio only.
  • Users who prefer not to install cosign and still load OCI plugins (unless they set insecure_skip_signature).
  • Users who need specific built-in tools (e.g., database operations) without wanting to configure plugins themselves.
  • Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
  • Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
  • Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
Required permissions
  • Read config files (for plugin configuration).
  • Execute cosign CLI to verify OCI plugin signatures.
  • Network access (to download plugins or for plugin runtime, e.g., allowed hosts).
  • Filesystem access (for local file plugins or logs).
  • Environment variables (e.g., RUST_LOG, HYPER_MCP_LOG_PATH, HYPER_MCP_INSECURE_SKIP_SIGNATURE).
  • Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
  • Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
  • Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
  • Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
Risks and side effects
  • Loading malicious or unverified plugins could compromise the system or leak data, though signature verification and sandboxing mitigate risks.
  • OCI signature verification depends on cosign; skipping it reduces security.
  • Misconfiguring plugins may allow them to access unauthorized network or filesystem resources.
  • Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
  • Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
  • Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
  • Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Cursor, Claude CodeClaude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue
Tools30