| FMRS | 59 / 100 · C | 75 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 9 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 12 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 11 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 15 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 12 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Users who already maintain a local Hyperresearch markdown vault and want other MCP clients to reuse the same notes
- Researchers who want their desktop AI client to read existing local material instead of re-searching the web every time
- Individual researchers or small teams who care about portability (plain markdown, git-friendly, JSON exportable)
| - Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
- Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
- Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
- Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
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| Not for | - Users who want zero setup and only the built-in Claude Code skill without maintaining a local vault
- Users who cannot install Python 3.11+ or run local command-line tools
- Users expecting the server to guarantee factual accuracy — the README states the lint gate catches structural failures only and factual accuracy remains the user's call
- Users who need paywalled content but have not completed a local login
| - Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
- Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
- Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
- Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
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| Required permissions | - Read and write the vault directory in the working tree (such as research/notes markdown files)
- Create and rebuild the SQLite index file; hyperresearch sync reconstructs it from markdown
- Make outbound network requests to fetch external URLs via tools such as fetch_url
- If embeddings are enabled, reach the configured embedding provider (voyage, openai; the default none needs no API keys)
- Local file-write permission required to create and update notes
| - Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
- Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
- Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
- Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
- Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
- Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
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| Risks and side effects | - Fetched web content is untrusted input: the README says fetched bodies are served inside <untrusted-source> fences and treated as data, and clients should keep the same stance to avoid being steered by embedded instructions
- Write tools (create_note, update_note) modify local vault files directly, so misuse can corrupt the note collection; keeping the vault under git is advisable for rollback
- Fetching external URLs exposes requests to third-party sites, potentially revealing the research topic or IP
- Scraping paywalled or login-gated sites is subject to those sites' terms, and login session credentials are the user's own responsibility
- Claims in the README such as the DeepResearch-Bench leaderboard position and 250+ sources are the project's own statements and a forward-looking projection; third-party validation is pending and should not be treated as proof of quality
| - A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
- Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
- If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
- `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
- Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
- The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
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| Supported clients | Claude Desktop, Cursor | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro |
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| Tools | 13 | 14 |
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