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DimensionIronCurtainA secure runtime for autonomous AI agents, with policy from plain-English constitutions.MartinLoop MCP ServerAn independent control layer that gives AI coding agents budgets, brakes, and receipts
FMRS52 / 100 · D79 / 100 · B
Reliability8 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions5 / 2018 / 20
Maintenance15 / 2016 / 20
Documentation14 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience10 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Developers and users who need strict security policies for AI agents
  • Teams that want to define security boundaries in natural language without sacrificing autonomy
  • Security researchers running agents in untrusted environments
  • Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
  • Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
  • Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
Not for
  • Scenarios where no security policy is needed and the agent can run freely
  • Simple tasks requiring minimal permissions or no external dependencies
  • Users who want out-of-the-box functionality without understanding the security model
  • Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
  • Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
  • Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
Required permissions
  • Requires access to filesystem, network, API keys, etc., for file and network operations
  • Requires Docker for Docker agent mode, providing strongest isolation
  • Requires an LLM API key (Anthropic, Google, or OpenAI)
  • Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
  • Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
  • Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
  • Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
Risks and side effects
  • Research prototype: APIs and configuration formats may change
  • Policy compilation may misinterpret intent; always review compiled rules
  • V8 isolate boundaries are not OS-level; a V8 zero-day could allow escape
  • In Docker mode, approved domains get raw passthrough tunnels without content inspection
  • Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
  • Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
  • Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
  • Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
Supported clientsClaude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue
Tools00