| FMRS | 50 / 100 · D | 70 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 5 / 20 | 11 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 10 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 13 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 14 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 8 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Users who want a desktop-grade AI agent that can directly operate local files, terminal, and browser workflows
- Users who want to remotely trigger desktop Agent tasks via WeChat, Feishu, DingTalk, Telegram, or similar IM channels
- Users needing office automation for documents, spreadsheets, slides, video, and web research
- Developers comfortable with Electron/React/TypeScript who want to build from source or use official installers
| - Developers using Hostinger services.
- Users who want to automate hosting tasks through AI assistants.
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| Not for | - Users who need an MCP server that a standard MCP client (e.g. Claude Desktop) can connect to directly — no such server manifest or tool definitions are provided in this repository
- Users needing a headless or server-side deployment — this project only ships as a macOS/Windows desktop application
- Users who want a narrow, single-purpose tool integration without granting broad file, terminal, and network permissions
| - Users not on Hostinger.
- Those needing to manage other cloud providers.
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| Required permissions | - Local file system read/write
- Terminal command execution
- Browser automation
- Network access
- IM channel binding and messaging (WeChat, WeCom, DingTalk, Feishu/Lark, QQ, Telegram, Discord, NetEase IM, NetEase Bee, POPO, email)
- Local SQLite storage (lobsterai.sqlite under Electron userData)
| - Requires a Hostinger API token or OAuth authorization.
- Can read and modify domains, hosting resources, etc., depending on token scopes.
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| Risks and side effects | - The app requires broad, sensitive permissions (file operations, terminal, network); the README notes sensitive actions are permission-gated and logged, but users must still review approval prompts carefully to avoid data loss or exposure
- Remote control via IM channels means commands can trigger desktop actions from linked messaging accounts — compromise of a bound account/channel could lead to unauthorized local execution
- Packaging bundles the OpenClaw runtime and, on Windows, a portable Python runtime, expanding the local attack surface
- This project is not maintained by the MCP protocol owner and is not a conventional MCP server; anyone wanting standard MCP-protocol integration should verify exposed behavior directly, as the source material gives no such details
| - High-risk operations (e.g., deleting websites) are irreversible.
- API token leakage could allow misuse of resources.
- Mistakes could cause website or service outages.
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| Supported clients | | Claude Desktop, Cursor, Gemini CLI |
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| Tools | 0 | 100 |
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