| FMRS | 67 / 100 · C | 75 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 11 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 14 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 14 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 13 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 15 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Accounting, ERP, CRM and finance-automation teams serving the Brazilian market.
- Developers who want local, offline NF-e/SPED processing without uploading XML to third parties.
- Users of MCP clients such as Claude or Cursor who want to query Brazilian tax data in natural language.
- Anyone needing offline reference tables such as NCM/CFOP/CST/CEST/ICMS and BCB indexers.
| - Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
- Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
- Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
- Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
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| Not for | - Users needing US or other non-Brazilian tax capabilities.
- Those expecting official government backing or an official MCP project (this server is maintained by DeHor-Labs, not officially).
- Anyone wanting SEFAZ real-time status, distribution or manifestation without configuring an A1 certificate.
- Large-scale CNPJ lookup by company name, which is experimental with limited coverage.
| - Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
- Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
- Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
- Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
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| Required permissions | - Runs locally as an MCP server over stdio; no account or API key required.
- Network access: calls BrasilAPI (cnpj, nfe, and more) plus an optional ReceitaWS fallback.
- Optional A1 digital certificate: requires reading a local .pfx/.p12 file and its password for SEFAZ mTLS and XMLDSig signing.
- Optional environment variables: MCP_FISCAL_LOG_LEVEL, BRASILAPI_BASE_URL, HTTP_TIMEOUT, and NFE_CERTIFICADO_PATH, NFE_CERTIFICADO_SENHA, NFE_EMITENTE_CNPJ, NFE_AMBIENTE.
| - Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
- Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
- Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
- Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
- Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
- Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
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| Risks and side effects | - Third-party sources (BrasilAPI, ReceitaWS, SEFAZ) can be unstable or change, making results stale or failing.
- With an A1 certificate enabled, the certificate file and password are sensitive local assets: inject them via a secrets manager as documented and never commit plaintext passwords.
- Tool outputs and advice (such as risk scores or regime comparisons) are informative and do not replace a professional accountant or legal advice.
- consultar_status_sefaz raises FiscalConfigurationError when no certificate is configured and the HTTP endpoint returns 503; distinguish this from an actual SEFAZ outage.
- The experimental listar_cnpjs_por_nome tool has limited coverage and may return unexpected results.
| - A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
- Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
- If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
- `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
- Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
- The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
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| Supported clients | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code + Continue | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro |
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| Tools | 25 | 14 |
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