| FMRS | 63 / 100 · C | 75 / 100 · B |
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| Reliability | 10 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 10 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 13 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 16 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 14 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Best for | - SEO practitioners who regularly analyze GSC search performance data
- Users of MCP-compatible clients such as Claude Desktop, Cursor, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI, or Antigravity
- Individuals and small teams who prefer natural-language conversation over manually exporting reports
- Users willing to configure their own Google Cloud credentials and run the server locally
| - Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
- Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
- Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
- Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
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| Not for | - Users who only want claude.ai in the browser and won't install the desktop app (the MCP server runs locally)
- Users who don't want to create a Google Cloud project and API credentials
- Users who need a hosted one-click sign-in with GA4 tools (the source points to a separate hosted version limited to 100 seats)
- Users running a cloned install on Python 3.10 or older
| - Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
- Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
- Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
- Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
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| Required permissions | - Google Search Console API access (read search analytics and site data)
- OAuth path requires Google account authorization, with the token cached locally
- Service account path requires adding the service account email as a Full access user on your GSC property
- Credential JSON file paths are provided by the user via the client config env
- Destructive operations (add_site, delete_site, delete_sitemap) are disabled by default and require explicitly setting GSC_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE=true
| - Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
- Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
- Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
- Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
- Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
- Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
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| Risks and side effects | - Credential JSON files contain sensitive keys and must be protected and kept out of version control
- If GSC_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE is enabled, the AI assistant can perform destructive actions such as adding/removing sites and deleting sitemaps
- Remote deployment with sse transport bound to 0.0.0.0 exposes the service on the network, so you must assess access-control risk yourself
- OAuth tokens are cached in the local platform user config directory, which may have access boundaries on multi-user machines
- Service account keys are long-lived, so a leak has a broad impact
| - A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
- Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
- If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
- `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
- Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
- The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
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| Supported clients | Claude Desktop, Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI, Antigravity | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro |
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| Tools | 15 | 14 |
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