M
MCP Directory CURATED DIRECTORY
911 MCP servers indexed
中文
← Back to directory
COMPARE UP TO 4 SERVERS

Compare MCP servers

Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionArm MCP ServerArm's official MCP server for architecture migration and optimizationMartinLoop MCP ServerAn independent control layer that gives AI coding agents budgets, brakes, and receipts
FMRS61 / 100 · C79 / 100 · B
Reliability9 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions11 / 2018 / 20
Maintenance13 / 2016 / 20
Documentation15 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience13 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Teams planning or executing an x86-to-Arm application migration
  • DevOps engineers verifying multi-architecture support in container images
  • Systems and embedded developers tuning performance on Arm platforms
  • Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
  • Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
  • Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
Not for
  • General development tasks unrelated to Arm architecture, migration, or performance
  • Environments that can't run Docker or don't allow mounting the local filesystem
  • Users unwilling to review locally generated log files that may contain project details before sharing them
  • Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
  • Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
  • Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
Required permissions
  • Requires mounting a local workspace directory into the container at /workspace, giving it read access to project code
  • Optionally mounts an SSH private key and known_hosts file for Arm Performix remote target access
  • Requires Docker execution rights to pull and run the container image
  • Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
  • Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
  • Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
  • Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
Risks and side effects
  • Generated log files (mcp-traffic.jsonl and error_logging.yaml) may contain project code snippets and tool call content — review before sharing
  • Mounting an SSH private key for remote access could expose credentials if misconfigured
  • The container needs local filesystem access via the workspace mount, which carries some path-exposure risk
  • Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
  • Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
  • Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
  • Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
Supported clientsClaude Code, VS Code, AWS Kiro CLI, Gemini CLI, CodexClaude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue
Tools00