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COMPARE UP TO 4 SERVERS

Compare MCP servers

Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionCouchbase MCP ServerLet AI agents securely connect to and work with data in Couchbase clustersMCP Toolbox for DatabasesGoogle's official database MCP toolbox — define AI-accessible database tools via config
FMRS72 / 100 · B74 / 100 · B
Reliability11 / 2013 / 20
Security and permissions16 / 2013 / 20
Maintenance13 / 2017 / 20
Documentation18 / 2016 / 20
Setup experience14 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Developers and data teams who want safe AI access to Couchbase data in mainstream MCP clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code, JetBrains IDEs)
  • Teams already using Couchbase (Capella or self-managed) who want LLM-assisted querying and analysis
  • Teams that want precise control over which database operations an AI can perform, rather than open arbitrary SQL execution
  • Scenarios needing a unified MCP setup across multiple database engines
Not for
  • Unattended write access to production databases without risk assessment (read-only mode blocks writes by default)
  • Users not running Couchbase or without a running cluster
  • Those needing official support-portal assistance (community-maintained; GitHub only)
  • Lightweight cases that just want to run a few ad-hoc SQL queries without maintaining a tools.yaml config (a simpler single-database MCP may be a better fit)
Required permissions
  • Couchbase connection string plus username/password for basic auth, or client certificate and key paths for mTLS, via environment variables or CLI arguments
  • CA root certificate path for TLS with self-signed/untrusted certificates on non-Capella clusters
  • Database user needs RBAC permissions to access at least one bucket — RBAC is the authoritative security control
  • Database credentials (username/password/connection string) are supplied via env vars or config
  • A tool's actual permission is whatever SQL statement is defined in tools.yaml — designed for least privilege, but misconfiguration can still over-expose access
Risks and side effects
  • CB_MCP_READ_ONLY_MODE defaults to true, disabling all writes; when false, the LLM can modify/delete documents, scopes, collections, and indexes
  • Disabling tools alone is not sufficient: SQL++ DML can still modify data via run_sql_plus_plus_query; use read-only mode or proper RBAC
  • delete_scope/delete_collection permanently destroy data
  • The HTTP endpoint is unauthenticated unless OAuth is configured
  • LLM outputs may be inaccurate; Couchbase does not review them and users are solely responsible
  • The product automatically collects usage/performance data (e.g., product version, IP address); see the Couchbase Privacy Policy
  • If tools.yaml defines SQL statements that allow unconstrained writes or deletes, the AI could accidentally modify data
  • The prebuilt toolsets (--prebuilt) favor convenience and may expose broader query capability than a specific business actually needs — use a custom tools.yaml in production
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf Editor, VS Code, JetBrains IDEsClaude Code, Gemini CLI, Zed, Antigravity
Tools330