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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionMediaWiki MCP ServerConnect AI clients to any MediaWiki through MCP.CompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS69 / 100 · C75 / 100 · B
Reliability10 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions14 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance13 / 2014 / 20
Documentation17 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience15 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Teams that need AI access to one or more MediaWiki wikis.
  • Users combining wiki retrieval with controlled content maintenance.
  • Users of Claude, Codex, VS Code, Cursor, or other listed MCP clients.
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Knowledge bases or content systems that do not use MediaWiki.
  • Workflows requiring writes without configuration or permissions.
  • Users expecting client or protocol compatibility that is not evidenced by the source.
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Read operations depend on the wiki being public or configured and reachable.
  • Write tools require the corresponding MediaWiki permissions; write tools are hidden from tools/list when the default wiki is read-only.
  • File uploads require allowed upload directories to be configured.
  • Cargo queries may require the runcargoqueries user right.
  • Private wikis and authenticated operations require OAuth, tokens, bot passwords, or another configured authentication method.
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • In HTTP mode, Authorization Bearer tokens are forwarded to MediaWiki; authentication should be handled by a reverse proxy with TLS termination outside an untrusted network.
  • Before exposing HTTP to others, configure allowed hosts and origins to reduce DNS-rebinding and cross-origin risks.
  • Write, delete, move, and upload tools can change wiki content or files; use least-privilege credentials.
  • Outbound URL fetching and uploads are subject to SSRF and size limits; internal destinations require MCP_TRUSTED_HOSTS.
  • Tool responses have content, file-data, request-body, and upload size caps.
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Code, Codex, Claude Desktop, VS Code, Cursor, Antigravity, OpenCode, Devin Desktop, Zed, LM StudioClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools4614