| FMRS | 54 / 100 · D | 75 / 100 · B |
|---|
| Reliability | 9 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
|---|
| Security and permissions | 11 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
|---|
| Maintenance | 13 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
|---|
| Documentation | 12 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
|---|
| Setup experience | 9 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
|---|
| Best for | - Developers and health-data teams that need to standardize heterogeneous lab reports and wearable data
- Teams that want a self-hosted, Apache-2.0, FHIR-oriented health-data stack
- Users plugging health-data tools into MCP clients such as Claude Desktop or Cursor
- Offline terminology and unit resolution with no network and no key
| - Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
- Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
- Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
- Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
|
|---|
| Not for | - Users who want a purely hosted, zero-deployment product
- Users expecting local GPU inference — reasoning relies on a hosted model provider
- Use as an official diagnostic or licensed clinical decision-making system
- Document extraction and agent Q&A without configuring any model API key
| - Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
- Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
- Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
- Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
|
|---|
| Required permissions | - Read health documents and device data the user uploads or imports (labs, wearables, genomics)
- Access user health records, including records shared in a care circle (gated by the per-row health_access field)
- Call the configured hosted model provider's API (key kept in .env, e.g. OPENROUTER_API_KEY)
- Serve agent tools to MCP clients, gated per user
| - Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
- Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
- Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
- Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
- Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
- Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
|
|---|
| Risks and side effects | - Health data is highly sensitive personal information; an exposed self-hosted deployment leaks medical records
- Care-circle sharing: an invited member still decides via health_access on their own row, and any route that forgets the check must answer 403 instead of handing over a record
- SEED_DEMO_DATA is on by default and should be set to false before a deployment holds real data
- Documents and photos are sent to the configured hosted model provider, and scanned pages reach a vision model — assess data residency and compliance
- The project is not a local LLM; assuming full offline operation can fail without network access
- Model provider API keys written into .env must be protected from commits or leaks
| - A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
- Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
- If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
- `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
- Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
- The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
|
|---|
| Supported clients | Claude Desktop, Cursor | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro |
|---|
| Tools | 0 | 14 |
|---|