← Back to directory
COMPARE UP TO 4 SERVERS

Compare MCP servers

Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionHevy MCP ServerManage workouts, routines, and exercise data through the Hevy APICompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS66 / 100 · C75 / 100 · B
Reliability9 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions14 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance12 / 2014 / 20
Documentation17 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience14 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Hevy PRO users
  • Fitness enthusiasts who want AI-assisted training analysis and planning
  • Developers who want to integrate Hevy data into MCP clients like Claude Desktop, Codex, Cursor
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Users without Hevy PRO subscription
  • Users who need deletion capabilities (Hevy API does not expose delete endpoints)
  • Users looking for official support (this is community-maintained, not affiliated with Hevy)
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Requires Hevy API key (`HEVY_API_KEY`)
  • Can read and write Hevy data (workouts, routines, exercise templates, body measurements, etc.)
  • Hosted endpoint validates the API key with Hevy on each request and forwards it as `api-key` header
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • API key leakage risk: never put key in source control, URLs, logs, or screenshots.
  • Mutation risk: create operations may produce duplicates on retry; update operations replace existing records.
  • Privacy: local package enables telemetry by default (can be disabled), sending errors and metrics to external services.
  • Dependency on third-party service: hosted endpoint relies on Cloudflare Worker, availability may vary.
  • Tool confirmation: mutation tools may require client confirmation, but support varies by client.
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Desktop, Codex, Cursor, AntigravityClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools2614