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Compare MCP servers

Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionOpenPencil MCP ServerMCP server bundled with the open-source AI-native design editor OpenPencilCompartmentEncrypted, fully offline long-term memory for AI agents
FMRS59 / 100 · C75 / 100 · B
Reliability8 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions12 / 2016 / 20
Maintenance11 / 2014 / 20
Documentation15 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience13 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Teams already using the OpenPencil desktop app or CLI who want AI agents to automate design workflows
  • Developers who need local, offline, account-free read/write access to Figma-compatible files
  • Engineering teams wanting to integrate design-file inspection or export into CI pipelines
  • Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
  • Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
  • Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
  • Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
Not for
  • Users who require official Figma support or an officially hosted service (OpenPencil is an unofficial third-party alternative, not affiliated with Figma)
  • Scenarios needing strictly read-only, minimal-privilege access (the eval capability runs the full Figma Plugin API, i.e. arbitrary scripts)
  • Non-technical users who are not comfortable with command-line tools or MCP client configuration
  • Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
  • Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
  • Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
  • Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
Required permissions
  • Local filesystem read/write, scoped by OPENPENCIL_MCP_ROOT (defaults to the current working directory)
  • RPC access to the live document/canvas when the desktop app is running
  • Local network listening on a Unix socket and 127.0.0.1:7600 when using the HTTP transport
  • Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
  • Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
  • Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
  • Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
  • Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
  • Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
Risks and side effects
  • The eval-related capability exposes the full Figma Plugin API, allowing arbitrary scripts to run against a design file — risk of accidental or malicious data modification/deletion
  • The project is explicitly under active development with acknowledged rough edges, so behavior can change between releases
  • It is an unofficial, community-built Figma alternative, not endorsed by or affiliated with Figma or an MCP protocol owner
  • A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
  • Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
  • If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
  • `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
  • Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
  • The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
Supported clientsClaude Code, Cursor, WindsurfClaude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro
Tools014