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Compare scores, permissions, risks, and fit in one decision-focused table.

DimensionSalesforce DX MCP ServerOfficial Salesforce DX toolset that lets LLMs read and operate on your authorized Salesforce orgs.MartinLoop MCP ServerAn independent control layer that gives AI coding agents budgets, brakes, and receipts
FMRS61 / 100 · C79 / 100 · B
Reliability9 / 2012 / 20
Security and permissions9 / 2018 / 20
Maintenance14 / 2016 / 20
Documentation16 / 2018 / 20
Setup experience13 / 2015 / 20
Best for
  • Developers already using the Salesforce CLI and a DX project
  • Teams that want an AI coding assistant to operate directly on Salesforce metadata, Apex, and LWC
  • Projects migrating Aura to LWC or adopting DevOps Center workflows
  • Engineering teams scaling AI coding agents while controlling spend
  • Platform teams that need auditable, rollback-aware agent execution records
  • Organizations using multiple agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini) under one governed flow
Not for
  • Users without a local Salesforce CLI setup or any authorized org
  • Cases needing only trivial read-only lookups without wanting the context overhead of the broader toolset (can be trimmed via --toolsets, but the default footprint is still sizable)
  • Developers who just want a simple code-completion helper without run governance
  • Teams unwilling to accept local JSONL run records with HMAC signing
  • Environments without a supported adapter (Claude/Codex/Gemini CLIs, direct provider, or verifier-only)
Required permissions
  • Requires orgs to be pre-authorized locally via `sf org login web` or equivalent
  • Access is scoped per `--orgs`: specific orgs, the default org/Dev Hub, or (use with caution) all authorized orgs
  • Several tools have write access — deploying/retrieving metadata, creating or deleting scratch orgs, assigning permission sets, committing DevOps Center work items
  • Read/write access to the configured repo root (writable scope restrictable via --allow-path/--deny-path)
  • Ability to invoke the chosen agent CLI (Claude/Codex/Gemini, etc.) and its underlying model account
  • Local disk writes for run records, receipts, and share outputs (share/run-receipt., etc.)
  • Execution of user-configured verifier commands (e.g. npm test)
Risks and side effects
  • `ALLOW_ALL_ORGS` grants the server access to every locally authorized org, which can expose production orgs if misconfigured
  • Tools like `deploy_metadata` and `delete_org` make real changes or deletions to orgs — misuse carries data/config risk
  • Telemetry is enabled by default; use `--no-telemetry` explicitly if privacy/compliance requires disabling it
  • `DEFAULT_TARGET_ORG`/`DEFAULT_TARGET_DEV_HUB` resolve dynamically on every tool call, so switching your local default org changes which org the server can act on
  • Verifier commands are executed; poorly chosen verifier commands carry security risk despite preflight policy checks
  • Cost and token figures may be estimates (labeled with provenance) and should not be treated as settled accounting
  • Receipt integrity must be verified before use as trustworthy evidence; missing rollback evidence is flagged as EVIDENCE_BOUNDARY
  • Policy defaults come from martin.config.yaml and can be overridden by CLI flags; misconfiguration can loosen safety boundaries
Supported clientsClaude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cline, Cursor, Trae, Windsurf, ZedClaude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cursor, VS Code, GitHub Copilot, Continue
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