| FMRS | 79 / 100 · B | 84 / 100 · B | 68 / 100 · C |
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| Reliability | 12 / 20 | 17 / 20 | 9 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 18 / 20 | 16 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 15 / 20 | 16 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 19 / 20 | 17 / 20 | 17 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 15 / 20 | 18 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Serious Obsidian users who want AI agents reading and writing their vault
- Users wanting self-hosted, plugin-free operation with no external APIs
- Mobile/multi-device workflows accessing the vault remotely
- Security-conscious users (OAuth 2.1, atomic writes, container hardening)
| - Local assistants that need to work inside explicitly approved directories
- Individuals and development teams that want path-based data boundaries
| - Users who want secure remote access to their Obsidian vault from any device.
- Integrating Claude.ai (web) or mobile with Obsidian.
- Those needing concurrent writes with Obsidian Sync without file conflicts.
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| Not for | - Users unwilling to run Docker or self-host a server
- Non-Obsidian note tools (Notion, Logseq, etc.)
- Scenarios requiring only a stdio local process without an HTTP server
- Remote multi-device sync without an Obsidian Sync subscription (the remote image requires one)
| - Highly sensitive environments that cannot allow model access to local file contents
- Shared remote file-service use cases
| - Users who only need local stdio MCP access without remote capabilities.
- Those unwilling to set up an OAuth password or use a Cloudflare Tunnel.
- Users with extremely high security requirements who distrust network exposure (though encrypted).
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| Required permissions | - Read/write access to the Obsidian vault folder (bind mount /vault, rw)
- Persistent /data volume (search index, OAuth token DB, logs)
- MCP_AUTH_TOKEN as Bearer token (also the JWT signing key)
- Obsidian Sync token for headless sync in remote mode
- Local download of embedding/reranker models (~45MB total), no external API calls
| - Read access to every local directory listed in the configuration
- Filesystem write access when write or move tools are enabled
| - Read and write files in the directory specified by VAULT_PATH.
- Perform file operations (move, delete with soft delete to .trash).
- Create daily notes, write binary files.
- Maintain an in-memory frontmatter index, potentially modifying index files.
- Access the network (for Cloudflare Tunnel, heartbeat URLs).
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| Risks and side effects | - The server can read and write personal notes — guard MCP_AUTH_TOKEN carefully; leaking it exposes the whole vault
- Writes to real note files; despite atomic writes and protected paths, misconfiguration can alter data
- OAuth token DB lives on the /data volume; container compromise could expose valid sessions
- Remote deployments expose a public port — set PUBLIC_URL and reverse proxy correctly
- The remote image bundles proprietary obsidian-headless (not MIT-licensed); requires an active Obsidian Sync subscription
| - Sensitive files inside an allowed directory may enter model context
- Write and move tools change real files; keep scopes narrow and maintain backups
| - Credential leakage: exposed OAuth password or MCP token could allow unauthorized access.
- Path traversal mitigation is not infallible; keep updated.
- Extension system is not sandboxed; loading untrusted extensions could be risky.
- Audit log is best-effort and not tamper-evident; records may be dropped at runtime.
- Misconfiguration may cause the server to fail to start or expose vulnerabilities.
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| Supported clients | Claude Code, Claude Desktop, claude.ai, Cursor, OpenCode, MCP Inspector | Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf | Claude Desktop, Claude Mobile, Claude Web |
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| Tools | 30 | 6 | 20 |
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