| FMRS | 53 / 100 · D | 75 / 100 · B |
| Reliability | 8 / 20 | 12 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 9 / 20 | 16 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 11 / 20 | 14 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 14 / 20 | 18 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 11 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
| Best for | - Individual users who want structured, multi-format notes from a single video link quickly
- Users working in Claude Code who are willing to have the current conversation Agent write notes directly
- Note workflows that combine speech transcription, visual understanding, danmaku, and comments from multiple sources
- Users who need task management, multi-video parallelism, and batch output
| - Individuals or teams who prioritise privacy and offline operation and do not want data leaving the machine
- Users who share memory across multiple MCP clients such as Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, Codex and Gemini CLI
- Scenarios that need encrypted storage, a hash-chained audit log and verifiable vault migration
- Users who want low-latency recall, a bundled embedding model and no extra LLM calls inside the memory layer
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| Not for | - Users whose clients do not support MCP / Claude Code Skill (the source only describes a Claude Code Skill and MCP Server form)
- Users who do not want to install local dependencies such as FFmpeg and whisper or download videos
- Scenarios needing a hosted backend service rather than local execution (this project requires no backend service to start)
| - Users who need cloud multi-device sync or a hosted team memory service; moving between machines means locking the vault and copying the file
- Users who expect the server itself to run an LLM that extracts facts and decides what to remember; Compartment explicitly keeps no LLM inside and leaves that to the host model
- Users who cannot keep a passphrase safe or who need a recovery path if it is lost, since Compartment never generates a password, seed or recovery phrase
- Deployments that require network transports such as SSE or streamable-http; this server is stdio only and opens no ports
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| Required permissions | - Read video links and download the corresponding media locally into task directories (note_results/{task_id}/raw/)
- Write generated artifacts locally (transcripts, notes, screenshots, frames, subtitle exports, etc.) into note_results/{task_id}/gen/
- Read and write the local SQLite database video_note.db (video_tasks global task index)
- Invoke local components such as FFmpeg and whisper
- Optional platform QR-code login (Bilibili, Douyin, etc.) and optional fallback LLM API key configuration
| - Read and write the vault file under the user's home directory, by default ~/.compartment/memory.vault, and its sibling settings file
- Access the session directory holding the unlock credential (configurable with COMPARTMENT_SESSION_DIR), which also carries the shared embedding process's Unix socket
- Optionally use the macOS keychain (compartment unlock --keychain is an explicit opt-in, and it survives reboots)
- Write or merge an mcpServers entry into each MCP client's own configuration file, taking a byte-exact backup first
- Install a PostToolUse hook for Claude Code that captures memory files the agent writes
- Serve a read-only dashboard on 127.0.0.1 behind a one-time random URL token
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| Risks and side effects | - Downloads video, cover, and other media files, consuming local disk space (cleanup keeps configuration and models by default)
- whisper transcription runs locally, so speed and resource use depend on machine performance
- Optionally enabling the fallback LLM requires providing an API key, creating key-management risk
- Platform QR-code login stores session state, involving account-credential risk
- Cleanup operations may delete task data; check first with cleanup(task_id, dry_run=True)
| - A leaked passphrase means the encrypted content can be decrypted; Compartment generates no recovery phrase and cannot recover a lost passphrase
- Enabling the memory_unlock tool places the passphrase in the model's context, which is why it is off by default
- If a 2FA keyfile is lost, for example a USB stick, the vault cannot be opened even with the passphrase
- `export --plaintext` writes the vault as unencrypted JSONL, so that file must be handled carefully
- Memory content can come from untrusted sources; recall wraps memories with a notice that they are stored data and content can be marked quarantined, but the host agent must still treat memory as data to limit prompt-injection risk
- The capture hook and client integration write into the user's own settings files, although the implementation backs up and merges rather than replacing
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| Supported clients | Claude Code | Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, Cursor, VS Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, OpenCode, LM Studio, AnythingLLM, BoltAI, Goose, Kiro |
| Tools | 6 | 14 |