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Blitz Strike

Community
Recon at speed. Analysis in depth. Validation before report.
Category
Dev Tools #339 of 438
Stars
★ 515 Very popular
Transport
stdio (local process)
Runtime
Bun 1.4+ · Node.js
Credentials
Optional API key
License
MIT
Last commit
Tools
52
42FMRS · D

Blitz Strike is a self-hosted MCP penetration-testing toolbelt that packages a three-tier methodology — recon, source analysis, live validation — as server-side tools, backed by a 130-tool catalog, 334 manual/playbook files, 57 escalation chains, and a substantial intelligence layer, plus a benchmark and coverage matrix (the README reports detection rate 1.0, false-positive rate 0, and 56/60 coverage pairs). Its defining stance is that a scan hit is a hypothesis and only a live test is a verdict, using marker reflection plus a negative control to suppress false positives. It is MIT-licensed and community-maintained rather than official, aimed at authorized security researchers. Users should note that live testing sends real requests and requires correct scope configuration, that ensure_tool modifies the local machine, that some datasets must be synced on demand, and that credentials are provided through environment variables.

Strongest · Documentation 13/20 Weakest · Security and permissions 4/20

Reliability
6/20
Security and permissions
4/20
Maintenance
9/20
Documentation
13/20
Setup experience
10/20
Why each score
Reliability 6/20
Static review only: no server manifest, source files, tests, or CI workflows were supplied, so the MCP init handshake, tool-list registration, and declared-vs-actual behavior cannot be verified. The README claims 130 tools, 57 chains, a 183-check suite, and a 1.0 detection / 0 false-positive benchmark, but every one of these is self-asserted with no reviewable artifact; missing evidence is deducted. The documented entry path (npx blitzstrike serve --mcp) is plausible, yet runtime requirements (Bun 1.4+), on-demand fetching of large datasets, and auto-installation of external security tools introduce failure modes with no disclosed error handling, so a high score is not justified.
Security and permissions 4/20
Scored in the red-line band and stated as such. This is an offensive-security server: live_recon, strike_verify, fuzzer_payloads, ensure_tool (auto-install), PayloadsAllTheThings, and nuclei templates give it the ability to send active test traffic and payloads to arbitrary targets, plus external asset lookup (FOFA with credentials) and NVD queries, so the network and data boundaries are broad. The only safeguard is a trailing disclaimer about authorized use; there is no evidence of mandatory pre-execution confirmation, rate/anti-DoS limits, default scope enforcement (scope_check is merely one tool, not a gate), or credential-at-rest handling. Absent source, least privilege and safe-by-default cannot be confirmed.
Maintenance 9/20
MIT license is explicit, the repo is not archived, it has 634 stars and 0 open issues, and the README points to CHANGELOG, ROADMAP, SECURITY disclosure, and CONTRIBUTING, with attribution and third-party license notices for vendored data, indicating governance intent. However, commit cadence, release history, dependency-update practice, and issue-response latency are not verifiable from the supplied material, so sustained maintenance cannot be confirmed and the score stays mid-range.
Documentation 13/20
Well-layered: the README covers the three-tier methodology, a tool inventory with parameter summaries, environment variables, CLI commands, client config snippets, validation criteria, and stated limitations, with dedicated installation/usage/AUTONOMY/manifesto pages and license notices. Examples are plentiful. Deductions: the many capability numbers (130 tools, 317 manuals, 11.9k templates, 1.0 detection) lack independently checkable sources, and operational details such as cost, timeouts, failure triage, and cache size are missing, leaving hidden assumptions.
Setup experience 10/20
The path is clear: zero-install npx doctor/install, install merges its entry into detected client configs without overwriting, and the README gives multi-client JSON snippets plus a source-build route and a dry-run preview. Capped below 15 by static calibration: whether MCP registration actually succeeds and matches official parameter format is unverifiable; Bun 1.4+ dependency, per-platform binaries, runtime dataset downloads, and config-file writes add fragility; platform differences and failure fallbacks are undocumented.

Static review · not runListed 2026-09-18

Read the FMRS scoring method →

Fit and risk

What it can accessReads local filesRuns commands or codeUses the network

Best for

  • Authorized security researchers and red/blue team engineers who want verify-before-report workflows
  • Agent users who want a full penetration-testing flow driven by one call inside an MCP client
  • Developers and security reviewers needing code audit (taint analysis, source-to-sink, variant analysis)
  • Teams that want a structured methodology plus knowledge base (manuals, playbooks, escalation chains) instead of scattered scripts

Not for

  • Anyone wanting to test external systems without explicit owner authorization
  • Anyone treating a scan hit as a confirmed vulnerability and skipping STRIKE validation
  • Users expecting everything to work offline out of the box — payloads and templates need `blitzstrike sync-data`, and fofa_search needs FOFA_EMAIL/FOFA_KEY
  • Users looking for an official or vendor-endorsed product; this is a community project

Required permissions

  • Read the source directory or files being audited
  • Run a local process over stdio (command `blitzstrike`, args `serve --mcp`)
  • Make outbound HTTP requests to the audited target for live validation and recon
  • Write to client MCP config files (install merges into existing config, never overwrites)
  • Read/write memory and data cache under ~/.blitzstrike (overridable via BLITZSTRIKE_HOME / BLITZSTRIKE_DATA)
  • Optional: FOFA_EMAIL / FOFA_KEY for FOFA access, and H1_USERNAME to add the X-HackerOne-Research header
  • ensure_tool may auto-install missing security tools on the local machine

Risks and side effects

  • Live validation and live_recon send real requests to targets; misconfigured scope or missing authorization can cause harm or legal exposure
  • ensure_tool auto-installation modifies the local environment and introduces supply/version risk
  • Payloads, nuclei templates, and exploitation manuals are offensive material that can be misused
  • Memory is stored append-only as JSONL at ~/.blitzstrike/memory.jsonl and may accumulate sensitive target data
  • FOFA and HackerOne credentials are supplied via environment variables and can leak
  • Automated scan results can still be false positives — the README insists every finding stays a hypothesis until strike_verify confirms it

Setup

Before you start

Runtime:Bun 1.4+ · Node.js

FOFA_KEY optionalsecret FOFA API key from your FOFA account settings; only needed for fofa_search.
Other optional settings (4)
FOFA_EMAIL optional FOFA account email, used together with FOFA_KEY for fofa_search asset queries.
H1_USERNAME optional Optional HackerOne username; when set, outbound testing requests carry the X-HackerOne-Research header for responsible-disclosure identification.
BLITZSTRIKE_HOME optional Optional override for the home directory (default ~/.blitzstrike).
BLITZSTRIKE_DATA optional Optional override for the data-cache directory (default ~/.blitzstrike/data).
  1. Run npx -y blitzstrike doctor to verify the environment (bun/node runtime, tool catalog, FOFA credentials, data layers); every issue comes with a fix: line.
  2. Run npx -y blitzstrike install. It detects installed agent CLIs (Claude Code, Cursor, OpenCode, Codex, Hermes, Gemini, Windsurf, Copilot, Cline) and merges the Blitz Strike entry into each config in its native format without overwriting existing MCP servers; add --dry-run to preview.
  3. Restart your agent and call run_engagement.
  4. From source: git clone https://github.com/shinthink/blitzstrike.git && cd blitzstrike && bun install && bun run src/index.ts serve --mcp.
  5. Client config example: under mcpServers, set command to blitzstrike and args to ["serve", "--mcp"]
claude_desktop_config.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "blitzstrike": {
      "command": "blitzstrike",
      "args": ["serve", "--mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Shown for Claude Desktop. Other clients may use a different file or key (VS Code uses "servers") — the configurator below converts it.

.vscode/mcp.json
{
  "servers": {
    "blitzstrike": {
      "command": "blitzstrike",
      "args": [
        "serve",
        "--mcp"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Goes in your project's .vscode/mcp.json (VS Code uses a "servers" key).

Terminal
claude mcp add blitzstrike -- blitzstrike serve --mcp

Run it in a terminal; replace any <…> placeholders with your own values first.

Check that it works

Run npx -y blitzstrike doctor to confirm the runtime and 130-tool catalog are OK, then check that the blitzstrike server appears in your MCP client's tool list and that run_engagement or list_chains returns results.

Troubleshooting

  1. Run `blitzstrike doctor` first: it checks the runtime (bun/node, OK/FAIL plus a fix), the 130-tool catalog (e.g. 63/130 installed, 67 on-demand), FOFA credentials (OK/WARN), and whether data layers are present
  2. If the catalog reports missing tools, use `ensure_tool(name)` or `blitzstrike sync-data` to fetch heavy datasets such as payloads and templates
  3. Server missing in the client: confirm you ran `blitzstrike install` (or preview with `--dry-run`) and restart the agent; if no client was detected, paste the printed snippet manually
  4. fofa_search unavailable: check that FOFA_EMAIL and FOFA_KEY are set; all other tools need no credentials
  5. Unexpected data-cache or memory location: check the BLITZSTRIKE_HOME / BLITZSTRIKE_DATA environment variables
  6. Suspecting a false positive: use eagle_eye to confirm the sink is really inside the reachable scope of an unauthenticated handler, and refute with the chain's negative_control
  7. Stale version or data: run `blitzstrike update` or use check_update to query the latest npm version

Things to try

Once connected, you can ask your AI assistant things like:

  • Audit ./src for unauthenticated entry points and dangerous sinks, then verify the findings with strike_verify.
  • Run a full run_engagement assessment against https://example.com.
  • Use eagle_eye to analyze the upload_file function in src/upload.php for sinks and auth gates in scope.
  • Look up SSRF payloads with payload_lookup and generate a report with CVSS scores.

Tools 52

blitz_scan read-only
Scan a source tree: enumerate unauthenticated entry points and dangerous sinks with file:line references.
blitz_file read-only
Same scan for a single file.
eagle_eye read-only
Return a function's full body, sinks in scope, and auth gates in scope.
eagle_grep read-only
Precision sink grep — report a hit only inside a function body, flagged guarded or un-guarded.
enrich_scan read-only
Scan and match detected sinks to escalation chains (chains.json).
strike_verify writes
Live HTTP verification with marker, negative control, and baseline.
strike_resolve writes
Attach a live STRIKE verdict to a finding and advance its lifecycle.
scope_check read-only
Enforce scope before active testing (no-DoS, exclusion-aware, mode-gated).
Show 44 more tools
run_engagement writes
Full three-tier audit in one call: scope gate → triage → chain enrichment → findings.
list_chains read-only
List all escalation chains in the data layer.
fofa_search read-only
FOFA asset index search (requires FOFA_EMAIL and FOFA_KEY).
nvd_lookup read-only
CVE lookup from NVD 2.0 (no key required).
live_recon read-only
Modular passive-first recon: fingerprint, WAF/tech/version, crawler, params, subdomains, Wayback, API discovery, port scan.
tool_lookup read-only
Look up a tool's command, flags, install, and check.
list_tools read-only
List all catalog tools, grouped by category.
skill_lookup read-only
Search the skills playbook knowledge base by topic.
list_skills read-only
List all skill playbooks.
read_skill read-only
Read the full content of a playbook.
ensure_tool writes
Check whether a tool is installed; if not, auto-install it.
read_tool_manual read-only
Read a full deep manual for a tool (317+ manuals).
list_manuals read-only
List all manuals and playbooks.
read_playbook read-only
Read an engagement playbook (web-app, api-security, AD, etc.).
list_playbooks read-only
List all 17 engagement playbooks.
cvss_score read-only
Compute a deterministic CVSS v3.1 base score, vector, and severity (self-computed, not read from NVD).
dedup_findings read-only
Collapse findings sharing a root cause (sink × source × CWE) into one group per root cause.
generate_report read-only
Emit a reproducible markdown/JSON report with summary and SHA-256 integrity hash.
run_enterprise_benchmark read-only
Run the labelled enterprise corpus and report detection rate, false-positive rate, and precision.
coverage_matrix read-only
Enumerate language × sink-class coverage (4 languages × 15 sink classes) plus coverage ratio.
taint_file read-only
Inter-procedural taint analysis (PHP) — reachable, sanitized, authorized sinks.
taint_scan read-only
Universal taint analysis (PHP/JS/TS/Python/Java) with source→sink tracing.
taint_tree read-only
Taint propagation tree — how a source flows to a sink.
trace_data_flow read-only
Window-based data-flow trace with sanitizer and auth-gate awareness.
variant_analysis read-only
Group reachable sinks into variant families.
list_languages read-only
List supported analysis languages and extensions.
detect_waf read-only
Detect a WAF from response headers/body (139 signatures).
tech_correlation read-only
Correlate tech to known vulns and CVEs (89 technologies).
cve_correlation read-only
Correlate a CVE to product, targets, and severity (53 CVEs).
port_correlation read-only
Correlate a port to service and attack vectors (103 ports).
fuzzer_payloads read-only
Fuzzing payloads, vulnerable patterns, and chain rules.
intel_summary read-only
Counts of every intelligence dataset.
payload_lookup read-only
Find exploit payloads (66 categories from PayloadsAllTheThings).
read_payload read-only
Read a full payload collection.
template_lookup read-only
Find nuclei detection templates (11.9k YAML signatures).
list_attack_vectors read-only
List the full web attack-vector taxonomy (34 categories, 588 vectors).
attack_vectors read-only
Enumerate the vector list for one category (e.g. ssrf, business logic, ai/llm).
check_update read-only
Query the npm registry for the latest blitzstrike version.
remember writes
Save a reusable insight (deduped); verified=true only if the marker reflected and the negative control stayed inert.
memory_lookup read-only
Search memory by topic/tag/content, scored.
memory_list read-only
List all memory entries, grouped by type.
memory_forget destructive
Remove a memory entry (append-only tombstone).
confidence_weights writes
Get or set the confidence-scoring weight factors.
finding_attach_evidence writes
Attach a redacted and hashed evidence record to a finding.

Use cases

Run a full three-tier audit (BLITZ → EAGLE-EYE → STRIKE) over a source directory
Validate findings live against an authorized URL using marker reflection and a negative control to remove false positives
Match reachable sinks against the 57 escalation chains to decide whether a finding is actually exploitable
Generate reproducible reports with a SHA-256 integrity hash and compute CVSS v3.1 scores
Look up CVEs (nvd_lookup), technology-to-vulnerability correlations, port attack vectors, and exploit payloads
Re-run quality metrics via run_enterprise_benchmark and coverage_matrix

Supported clients

Claude Desktop
Claude Code
Cursor
OpenCode
Hermes
Gemini
Windsurf
GitHub Copilot
Cline

Listed from the project's documentation, not tested by this site.

Overview

Blitz Strike is a structured penetration-testing methodology delivered as a universal MCP server (TypeScript / Bun), mapping reconnaissance, source analysis, and live validation onto three callable tool tiers that run server-side. Tier 1, BLITZ, maps the attack surface: it enumerates unauthenticated entry points and dangerous sinks at scale with file:line references. Tier 2, EAGLE-EYE, performs static analysis and data-flow tracing, matching source-to-sink reachability against an escalation-chain graph. Tier 3, STRIKE, performs live validation via marker reflection plus a negative control, and enforces scope. A single run_engagement call drives scope gating, triage, chain enrichment, and findings, with the LLM automatically classifying the target (URL → live pipeline, filesystem path → source pipeline). Beyond the three tiers it ships a 130-tool catalog, 317 deep tool manuals, 17 engagement playbooks, an intelligence layer (139 WAF signatures, 89 technologies, 53 CVEs, 103 ports, 66 payload categories, ~11.9k nuclei templates, 34 attack-vector categories / 588 vectors), CVSS v3.1 scoring, dedup, reproducible reports, and a self-growing memory layer. It is intended for security researchers and teams performing authorized assessments.

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Source revision ce0b30b106a4 Data synced 2026-11-02 Read the FMRS scoring method