- Reliability 10/20
- The README describes a substantial build/test apparatus (validate, a per-file ≥90% coverage gate, an end-to-end smoke suite including a headless-Chromium boot check, verify:build-gate, and pack:verify which installs the real published tarball into a throwaway consumer), and references a concrete workflow path (.github/workflows/main.yml). This is detailed and plausible, but no server manifest or tool list was supplied ('not cached'), so the MCP init/tool-list handshake cannot be verified from the given material. Inspector is also itself a meta-tool for testing other MCP servers rather than a conventional single-tool MCP server, so 'declared tools vs. real behavior' cannot be checked here. Per the static calibration rule, since the workflow/test files themselves were not directly inspected (only README's description of them), the score stays conservative and does not credit unverified execution evidence.
- Security and permissions 15/20
- The documentation shows a deliberately cautious default posture: binding to 0.0.0.0 is refused by default and requires an explicit DANGEROUSLY_BIND_ALL_INTERFACES=true opt-in; auth is on by default and disabling it requires DANGEROUSLY_OMIT_AUTH=true, with dangerous flags clearly prefixed 'DANGEROUSLY_'; the Docker image runs as the non-root 'node' user; and ALLOWED_ORIGINS provides an origin allow-list. These reflect explicit confirmation and some least-privilege awareness, and none of this meets red-line criteria. However, the README itself acknowledges the backend is 'process-spawning' and can be exposed to the local network, without detail on sandboxing of spawned child processes, or how OAuth tokens/API tokens are protected at rest or redacted from logs — data-flow disclosure is incomplete, so full marks are not warranted.
- Maintenance 17/20
- Evidence points to mature governance: a v2/main vs. legacy-main branch strategy, an issue-driven workflow (PRs must reference 'Closes #issue'), an AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md contribution contract, OIDC-based npm trusted publishing with provenance signing via GitHub Actions, a release flow with tag/version verification, and numerous specific issue references (#1636, #1769, #1791, #1792, etc.) indicating active issue tracking. The README explicitly states 'License: MIT' in its own License section, though the repository metadata field supplied in this task lists the license as unknown — this inconsistency is a minor deduction. No explicit security-response channel (e.g., SECURITY.md or a security contact) is described, which is also deducted.
- Documentation 18/20
- Documentation is layered and thorough: the main README, per-client READMEs, task-oriented guides under docs/ (MCP server configuration, App review workflow), an AGENTS.md contribution contract, a specification/ directory with diagrams, and unusually detailed showcase tables for test-server configs covering pagination, subscriptions, tasks, logging, and MRTR round-trips, including expected behaviors. Some limitations are disclosed (e.g., Mcp-Param header mirroring skipped in the browser, SDK v2 dropping tasks support). Minor gaps: no consolidated troubleshooting section and no cost discussion (of low relevance since this is a free open-source tool).
- Setup experience 13/20
- Setup is described clearly: a single npx command dispatches to web/cli/tui modes, Docker run examples with environment-variable explanations (including the origin-mismatch failure mode from port remapping and its fix), and a pack:verify script that simulates a real npx install against the published tarball. Per the static calibration rule, since the actual workflow/test files were not directly inspected here (only README's self-description), the score cannot exceed 15. Additionally, Inspector is a standalone inspection client rather than a typical MCP server added to a host's config (e.g., Claude Desktop), so no 'add this server to a mainstream client's config' example is provided — a modest gap relative to the setup dimension's usual expectations.