| FMRS | 63 / 100 · C | 66 / 100 · C |
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| Reliability | 8 / 20 | 8 / 20 |
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| Security and permissions | 12 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Maintenance | 15 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Documentation | 15 / 20 | 15 / 20 |
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| Setup experience | 13 / 20 | 13 / 20 |
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| Best for | - Heavy Notion users who want Markdown-based collaboration with AI agents
- Developers integrating Notion workflows into Claude Code, Cursor, and similar clients
- Automation scenarios needing the full Notion surface: uploads, comments, block-level edits
| - Developers, content creators, and project teams using Atlassian Cloud
- Teams that want Atlassian access inside ChatGPT, Claude, Cursor, or VS Code
- Users who need natural-language search, write, and cross-product workflows
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| Not for | - Users seeking a server officially supported by Notion (this is third-party open source)
- Users unwilling to grant a Notion integration token or complete OAuth consent
- Environments with Node.js < 24 and no Docker available
| - Users without an Atlassian Cloud site or relevant product permissions
- Deployments requiring a self-hosted MCP server
- Users unwilling to grant an AI client access to Atlassian data or actions
- Jira Service Management or Bitbucket Cloud workflows requiring OAuth authentication
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| Required permissions | - Requires a Notion integration token (ntn_ prefix); it can only access pages explicitly shared with the integration
- HTTP mode requires a Notion Public Integration OAuth client ID and secret
- Token is passed via the NOTION_TOKEN environment variable and is a secret
| - Jira and Confluence provide read, write, and search permission groups
- Jira Service Management provides read and write access through API tokens only
- Bitbucket Cloud provides read and write access through scoped API tokens only
- Compass is available through OAuth 2.1 only
- The first OAuth installer for a site must have access to the Atlassian apps requested by the MCP scopes
- Organization administrators can manage domain controls, API-token authentication, app access, and audit logs
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| Risks and side effects | - Third-party project not maintained by Notion; review the code yourself
- In stdio mode the token is stored AES-GCM encrypted in a local config file, but the integration token itself is broad in scope
- In hosted HTTP mode tokens live only in process memory and are cleared on restart
- Setting MCP_AUTH_DISABLE=1 on a shared/public deployment collapses all users into a single token bucket -- a serious risk
- Earlier versions had instability around credential handling and daemon-bridge auto-spawn; use the latest release
| - AI clients can perform Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Bitbucket, and Compass actions on the user’s behalf
- Prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, and tool-poisoning attacks may cause data exfiltration or unintended changes
- Use least privilege, scoped tokens, and minimal project or workspace access
- Require human confirmation for high-impact or destructive actions and monitor audit logs
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| Supported clients | Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI, Windsurf | OpenAI ChatGPT, Claude, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, GitHub Copilot CLI, Google Gemini CLI, Amazon Quick Suite, Local MCP-compatible clients via mcp-remote |
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| Tools | 11 | 0 |
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